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“CURST BE HE THAT MOVES MY BONES:”∗ 
THE SURPRISINGLY CONTROLLING ROLE OF RELIGION IN 
EQUITABLE DISINTERMENT DECISIONS 
PETER ZABLOTSKY∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At least since the nineteenth century, the courts in the United States 
have had to decide cases involving disinterment.1  The challenges posed by 
this task have been continuous, with disputes over the remains of slain civil 
rights era victim Emmett Till and the remains of soldiers killed in Iraq 
providing the most recent, trying contexts.2  The circumstances surrounding 
these private disputes are difficult, heart wrenching, and compelling—a 
bitter conflict arises among grieving surviving family members;3 or, a 
conflict between some family members on the one hand, and the beliefs of a 
decedent who was a devout follower of a religion, supported by the 
representatives of the consecrated ground of that religion, on the other.4 
As there are no ecclesiastical courts in the United States, one might 
expect that disinterment disputes—at least in those instances in which the 
decedent failed to execute the relevant legally controlling document—
would be resolved in equity based upon the interests of the feuding next-of-
kin; and in fact, in cases in which religion is not a factor, this is precisely 
what has happened.5  Surprisingly, however, in cases in which religion is 
relevant, it has assumed a controlling role.  In these cases, religious 
concerns permeate every aspect of the analysis, and trump the equities that 
 
 ∗Imprecation on Shakespeare’s Tomb at Stratford, England. 
 ∗∗Peter Zablotsky is a Professor of Law at the Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  
He received his Juris Doctor from the Columbia University School of Law in 1980. 
1. See R.F. Martin, Annotation, Removal and Reinterment of Remains, 21 A.L.R.2d 472 
(2004) [hereinafter Removal and Reinterment] (discussing early cases involving disinterment). 
2. Gretchen Ruethling, Kin Disagree on Exhumation of Emmett Till, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 
2005 at A23; Dean E. Murphy & Carolyn Marshall, Family Feuds Over Soldier’s Remains, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at A14. 
3. See, e.g., Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, at 474; Heather Conway, Dead, But Not 
Buried: Bodies, Burial and Family Conflicts, 23 LEGAL STUD. 423, 423-24 (2003). 
4. See Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, §§ 11, 14, 15 (providing discussions on 
religious considerations, conflict between spouse and blood relations or cemeteries or religious 
architecture, and conflict among blood relations, or between them and the cemetery or religious 
authorities); see also Kieron McEvoy & Heather Conway, The Dead, the Law, and the Politics of 
the Past, 31 J. L. & SOCIETY 539, 540 (2004) (discussing cultural and political conflicts relating 
to dead bodies). 
5. See supra text accompanying note 3 (considering private disputes regarding disinterment). 
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normally operate in favor of the next-of-kin.  Indeed, a review of the rele-
vant authorities appears to compel a universally applicable conclusion, to 
wit, while the circumstances of the disputes surrounding disinterment are 
difficult and varied, there is at least, unity in result.  The courts have refused 
to allow disinterment in every case involving a decedent who showed by his 
actions that he was devoted to his religion, whose remains were interred in 
the consecrated ground of his religion, and whose disinterment was pro-
hibited by the beliefs and practices of his religion.  Put another way, there 
are no cases in which a court has allowed disinterment at the behest of a 
surviving family member when the decedent was religious, interred in the 
consecrated ground of that religion, and the belief system of that religion 
forbade disinterment.6 
This article examines and analyzes the controlling role religion has 
assumed in disinterment cases.  After briefly reviewing some general back-
ground material, the article turns to a discussion of the role of religion in 
determining the wishes of the decedent.  Next, the article examines the role 
of religious institutions when they inject themselves with the disinterment 
decision.  Then, the article looks at the effect religion has on the public 
interest as it relates to disinterment generally, and statutes addressing 
disinterment, specifically.  Finally, the article considers the impact of the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause on these religious 
oriented disinterment decisions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Without exception, disputes regarding disinterment are decided, 
ostensibly, by well-settled, decades old equitable considerations.  More 
generally, state courts in the United States have long held that there is a 
strong presumption against disinterment,7 going so far as to limit the act to 
a “rare emergency”8 or “circumstances of extreme exigency,”9 and require a 
showing of “strong and convincing evidence.”10 
 
6. See, e.g., Mitty v. Oliveira, 244 P.2d 921, 929 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Friedman v. 
Gomel Chesed Hebrew Cemetery Ass’n, 92 A.2d 117, 119-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952); 
Dutcher v. Paradise, 217 A.D.2d 774, 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Goldman v. Mollen, 191 S.E. 
627, 634-35 (Va. 1937); Ingraffia v. Doughtery, 29 North. Co. R. 294 (Pa. 1944); Seifer v. 
Schwimmer, 1 N.Y.S.2d 730, 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937); Klahr v. Nadel, 1 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734-35 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1937); In re Weinstein, 277 N.Y.S. 425, 425-26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935); Datz v. 
Dougherty, 41 Pa. D. & C. 505, 515-16 (1941). 
7. See, e.g., Maffei v. Woodlawn Memorial Park, 130 Cal. App. 4th 119, 130 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
8. Mitty, 244 P.2d at 926. 
9. Zablotower v. Mt. Zion Cemetery, 413 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (citing 
Grinnan v. Fredericksburg Lodge, 88 S.E. 79 (Va. 1916)). 
10. Maffei, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 126. 
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As summed up by one commentator: 
Despite the inconsistencies with which American cases on 
exhumation and removal of remains are rife, to this extent they all 
agree in principle: The normal treatment of a corpse, once it is 
decently buried, is to let it lie.  This idea is so deeply woven into 
our legal and cultural fabric that it is commonplace to hear it 
spoken of as a “right” of the dead and a charge on the quick.  
Neither the ecclesiastical, common, nor civil system of 
jurisprudence permits exhumation for less than what are 
considered weighty, and sometimes compelling, reasons.  Securing 
“unbroken final repose” has been the object of both civil and 
criminal legislation.11 
In those instances in which applications are considered, the factors relevant 
to a decision regarding the disinterment of a decedent are: (1) the wishes of 
the decedent; (2) the interest of the public; (3) the rights and feelings of 
those entitled to be heard by reason of relationship or association; and, (4) 
the rights and principles of the religious body which granted the right to 
inter at the first place of burial.12 
As articulated, these are neutral factors; in cases with respect to which 
religion is not relevant, they are applied in a neutral fashion.  However, for 
those cases with respect to which religion is relevant, three of the four 
factors are applied in a way that elevates religion to a controlling role in the 
disinterment decision.  It is to a discussion of the impact of religion on the 
articulated equitable factors that this article now turns. 
III. THE DOMINANT, INDEED CONTROLLING, ROLE OF RELIGION 
A. WHEN A DECEDENT HAS LIVED HIS ADULT LIFE AS A DEVOTED 
MEMBER OF A RELIGION PROHIBITING DISINTERMENT, THE 
COURTS ARE UNANIMOUS IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DECEDENT 
WOULD NOT WISH TO BE DISINTERRED 
As stated above, when applications for disinterment are considered, 
one of the critical factors relevant to the analysis is the decedent’s wishes 
expressed in his or her lifetime.13  While only two courts have specifically 
 
11. Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, at 476. 
12. The authorities in support of the application of these factors are legion.  See, e.g., id. at 
§ 2(a); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 67 (2007). 
13. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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stated that they consider this factor to be the most significant,14 the fact is 
that when a case involves a religious decedent, virtually all courts have 
treated this factor with special deference; they have, in virtually every 
published opinion, treated the decedent’s “wishes” and religious beliefs as 
one in the same.  In case after case, the courts have concluded that a 
religiously devoted decedent would wish the tenets of his religion to remain 
applicable in death, and that a decedent devoted to a religion prohibiting 
disinterment would not wish to be disinterred; as a result, they have 
categorically refused to allow disinterment.  In so holding, those courts 
have not relied on any particular statement—ambiguous, clear or otherwise 
—of the deceased, but instead looked to the presence of a lifetime of 
religious devotion.15 
One of the first cases to apply this line of reasoning and proceed under 
these assumptions was In re Donn,16 where the surviving children sought to 
disinter the remains of their deceased mother and remove the remains to a 
family plot.17  The mother had been a practicing Roman Catholic all her 
life, and, pursuant to her request buried in a Roman Catholic cemetery.18  In 
denying the petition for removal, the court put the greatest emphasis on the 
decedent’s wishes, and determined her wishes by examining her religious 
devotion.19  Specifically, the court first reviewed church law regarding 
disinterment, stating that the cemetery was under the rules and regulations 
of the Roman Catholic Church, that its grounds, pursuant to the rites and 
canons of the Roman Catholic Church, had been consecrated to the burial of 
the members thereof, and that the rules and canons of the Church forbade 
the removal of bodies buried in consecrated grounds.20  The court concluded 
that religious devotion was the ultimate determinant of the decedent’s 
wishes, stating: 
 
14. See Mitty v. Olivera, 244 P.2d 921, 926-27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Cordts v. Cordts, 
118 P.2d 556, 558 (Kan. 1941) (“Speaking generally, perhaps primary importance is given to the 
wishes of the deceased.”). 
15. Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, at 498.  One thing the court seems to actually be 
doing is to divine the wishes of the deceased; and if he were a staunch adherent of a given church, 
it may be presumed that his wishes were that his remains should be treated in accordance with its 
rules.  Similarly, “[t]here is a presumption that, if the decedent was a devout member of a 
religious organization whose principles were opposed to the disturbance of sepulcher, the 
decedent would wish his or her remains to be treated in accordance with the rules of that religion.”  
Dead Bodies, supra note 12, § 67. 
16. 14 N.Y.S. 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891). 
17. In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 189. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 190. 
20. Id. at 189. 
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There is, however, another and a more serious question.  The 
deceased was a member of a Roman Catholic Church.  I assume 
that she entertained the views in reference to her burial common to 
the members of that body, and that she believed that her welfare 
after death depended to some extent upon whether her body was 
interred in ground consecrated by her church.21 
Goldman v. Mollen22 followed In re Donn.  In Goldman, the children 
of a deceased father sought to disinter his remains from an Orthodox Jewish 
cemetery, and remove them to a Reformed Jewish cemetery so the remains 
could rest next to the remains of his deceased wife and the children’s 
mother.23  The court devoted much of its opinion to establishing that, while 
the decedent never clearly stated where he wanted to be buried, his devotion 
to his religion was critical proof of his wishes.24  The court began its 
analysis by stating that while it was true that the decedent “did not 
expressly state to anyone . . . where he desired to be buried, . . . he was 
[nonetheless] an [O]rthodox Jew and was a member, officer and priest in 
his synagogue.”25  From this, the court concluded “that h[is] desir[ing] that 
his body . . . be dealt with according to the tenets of his faith was an 
inevitable conclusion,”26 and that his “whole life is an impressive expres-
sion of his will.”27  The court expanded and commented upon the breadth of 
its reasoning, stating: 
We do not doubt that a devout Catholic would wish to be buried in 
consecrated ground and would object to his body being taken from 
such a place and put in a Protestant cemetery, and we do not doubt 
that a Bombay Parsee would wish to come to final rest on Malabar 
Hill.  These are among the things we know without being told.28 
The court then found that disinterment violated the tenets of Orthodox 
Judaism and denied the petition for disinterment, concluding that “the 
wishes of the deceased, particularly when their origin rests on matters of 
faith, are not to be overlooked,” and that “[t]he faith of those surviving 
might change but the wishes of the dead are irrevocable.”29 
 
21. Id. at 190.  
22. 191 S.E. 627 (Va. 1937). 
23. Goldman, 191 S.E. at 628. 
24. Id. at 634-35. 
25. Id. at 631. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 633. 
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Subsequently, in Ingraffia v. Doughtery,30 the court stated its views in 
language still more profound.  Ingraffia involved a wife who sought to 
remove the remains of her deceased husband from a Roman Catholic 
cemetery to a non-Catholic cemetery.31  The church authorities opposed the 
widow because disinterment under such circumstances violated canon law.  
In denying the widow the right to disinter, the court relied almost 
exclusively on the fact that the decedent had been a devout Catholic, and 
that even though he never stated a preference regarding his burial, such 
devotion created a “compelling influence” regarding his wishes.32  On this 
latter point, the court stated: 
While [the decedent] did not by will or otherwise state his desire 
as to burial, his continued adherence during his life to the Catholic 
faith raises the compelling inference that he desired interment in 
consecrated ground in accordance with the canons, rules and 
regulations of the Catholic Church.  Due regard for the religious 
faith of [the decedent] requires us to keep inviolate that faith even 
in his last repose.33 
Then, in language that indicated the depth of the court’s feeling on the 
issue, the court intoned that “to deny to the dead the faith which sustained 
them in life is to deny to the living the faith that sustains them in death.  In 
this sense the fundamental American ideal of religious freedom transcends 
the confines of the grave.”34 
A California decision, Mitty v. Oliveira, 35 epitomizes these principles, 
and accords ultimate respect to the wishes of the individual as manifest by 
religious devotion in life.  In Mitty, a widow sought to disinter and cremate 
the remains of her deceased husband and sons, from a Roman Catholic 
cemetery.36  The archbishop of the church opposed disinterment and crema-
tion because the act violated Canon law.37  The court first stated that, as a 
guiding legal principle, the wishes of the deceased were of “primary impor-
tance.”38  Then, the court applied this principle, and determined what those 
wishes were, by relying, exclusively, on the fact that both the husband and 
 
30. 29 North Co. R. 294 (Pa. 1944). 
31. Ingraffia, 29 North Co. R. at 300. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. 244 P.2d 921 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). 
36. Mitty, 244 P.2d at 924. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 926. 
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son had lived their lives as devout Roman Catholics.39  Specifically, the 
court focused on the fact that the decedents “lived and died members of a 
church whose tenets placed great emphasis upon the importance of burial of 
its members in consecrated ground and proscribed the cremation of their 
remains;” and that, “[t]here is a presumption, from the very fact of their 
membership in that church, that [they] subscribed to those tenets and 
desired to be buried in compliance therewith.”40  Based on the decedents’ 
wishes as manifest by their actions (religious devotion) when alive, and the 
tenets of the church to which they were devoted, the court denied the 
petition for disinterment.41 
Other jurisdictions have handed down identical holdings in all manner 
of compelling circumstance.  For example, in Friedman v. Gomel Chesed 
Hebrew Cemetery Ass’n of Elizabeth,42 a case in which the children of a 
deceased mother sought to disinter her remains from one religious cemetery 
to a family plot in another cemetery, the court again focused its analysis on 
the wishes of the decedent as manifest by her religious devotion.43  
Specifically, the court stressed that the decedent was a practitioner of the 
rules of the Orthodox Jewish faith, that she was a strict adherent to the 
dietary laws of that faith, and that this adherence was “a measure of the 
orthodoxy” of the decedent.44  Based upon this adherence, the court as-
sumed that the decedent’s wishes were made manifest by her religious 
devotion, stating: “She was in essence a practitioner or an adherent to the 
tenets of the [O]rthodox Jewish faith and I assume that it was with her 
approval that she was buried in consecrated ground, and that ‘the disin-
terment of the bodies buried in hallowed ground is not in accordance with 
rabbinical law.’”45  After so assuming, the court concluded that to disturb 
the repose of the body of the decedent would be in violation of deeply held 
religious beliefs and would run counter to the wish of the deceased.46  The 
court so held despite discussing as “praiseworthy and decorous” the 
 
39. Id. at 926-27. 
40. Id. at 926.  
41. Id. at 927. 
42. 92 A.2d 117 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952). 
43. Id. at 118-19. 
44. Id. at 118. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 119.  The court also quoted Justice Cardozo as to the significance of the wishes of 
the religiously devoted, stating: 
I do not think I could take a better guide than that of Justice Cardozo, and I quote: 
“The wish of the deceased, even though legal compulsion may not attach to it has at 
least a large significance.  Especially is this so when the wish has its origin in intense 
religious feeling.” 
Id.  (quoting Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 128 (N.Y. 1926)). 
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feelings “of kinsmen near in blood to satisfy a longing that those united 
during life shall not be divided after death.”47 
Similarly, in Dutcher v. Paradise,48 the decedent’s father sought to 
have his son’s remains disinterred from a Roman Catholic cemetery and 
removed to a family plot.49  The court stated that, “[i]n great measure the 
resolution of this issue is governed by the wishes of the decedent,” but the 
parties presented statements attributed to the decedent that conflicted as to 
his wishes regarding his last resting place.50  In resolving the conflict and 
denying the petition for disinterment, the court again considered religious 
devotion the ultimate determinant of the decedent’s wishes.51  Specifically, 
relying on the fact that the decedent had been a devout Roman Catholic, the 
court stated “that [the] decedent was a lay catechist, . . . which indicates 
that, in accordance with the tenets of his faith, he would undoubtedly prefer 
to be buried in St. Mary’s Cemetery, which has been consecrated by the 
Roman Catholic Church, rather than in the unconsecrated Prospect Hill 
Cemetery.”52 
As the foregoing cases illustrate, there have been a significant number 
of published opinions involving decedents who during their lifetimes were 
religiously devoted, but who never unambiguously, or sufficiently as a 
matter of law, expressed the wish that their remains rest undisturbed as 
proscribed by the tenets of their faith.  In every such case, and in language 
that is often compelling, the courts have attached ultimate significance to, 
and drawn definitive assumptions from, the fact that the decedent led a 
religious life and have denied the next of kin the right to disinter. 
B. THERE ARE NO REPORTED COMMON LAW CASES ALLOWING 
DISINTERMENT OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF A CEMETERY 
GOVERNED BY A RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION WHOSE RELIGIOUS 
BELIEFS CLEARLY PROHIBIT DISINTERMENT 
For over a century, the common law has dictated that the sanctity of 
consecrated ground be protected, and that disinterment from a religious 
cemetery controlled by the denomination that proscribes disinterment 
simply not be allowed in cases of purely private disputes.53  From a narrow 
legal perspective, the protection from desecration by disinterment afforded 
 
47. Id. 
48. 629 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1995). 
49. Dutcher, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 501. 
50. Id. at 502. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. See infra text accompanying notes 61-144. 
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consecrated ground is found among the factors that courts consider in 
disinterment cases generally.  As stated previously, one of the factors 
articulated unanimously by the courts is “the rights and principles of the 
religious body or other institution, which granted the right to inter the body 
at the first place of burial.”54  From a broader perspective, this factor is in 
some ways subsumed by the factors which seek to respect the beliefs of the 
religious individual, and in other ways is greater than the sum of those 
individual beliefs.  To wit, if an individual believes that his remains must 
rest undisturbed so as to accomplish a divine purpose, then the religious 
authorities opposing disinterment are respecting and protecting the beliefs 
of the individual; in this way, considerations relevant to a religion generally 
are subsumed by the equitable factors related to the decedent’s wishes.55  At 
the same time, requiring that the rights and beliefs of the religious 
denomination governing the place of interment be considered protects the 
tenets of the entire religious community to which the individual chose to 
belong.  Considering the tenets of the relevant faith opposed to disinterment 
avoids shocking the religious feelings of the members of the affected 
religious community,56 offending adherents of an entire faith,57 and dese-
crating holy ground, along with all of the negative connotations that that 
implies.58 
Regardless of the perspective taken on this factor—be it to protect the 
beliefs of the decedent or to preserve the tenets of an entire faith—the end 
result is the same: no reported decision has ever sanctioned disinterment 
from sanctified ground when disinterment was opposed by the religion 
governing that ground.  One of the seminal case applying this factor is 
Mitty.59  On the issue of considering and respecting the tenets of the faith 
opposed to disinterment, the court began its analysis by observing that 
“frequently . . . the prohibitions of religious law . . . require attention.”60  
Then, in refusing to allow disinterment despite the compelling case made 
by the next of kin (mother), the court held: “The church, which controls this 
cemetery, withholds its consent.  That withholding is neither whimsical nor 
unreasonable, we think, in view of the very tenets we have mentioned.”61 
 
54. Mitty v. Oliveira, 244 P.2d 921, 926 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (quoting Dead Bodies, 
supra note 12, § 22); In re Keck, 171 P.2d 933, 936 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946). 
55. See Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, at 498. 
56. See, e.g., Seifer v. Schwimmer, 1 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732-33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937). 
57. See, e.g., Klahr v. Nadel, 1 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937). 
58. See, e.g., In re Weinstein, 277 N.Y.S. 425, 425-26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935). 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41. 
60. Mitty v. Oliveira, 244 P.2d 924, 926 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). 
61. Id. at 927. 
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Finally, the court specifically “mentioned” those tenets in great detail, 
noting, inter alia, that: (1) “all rights of interment [and disinterment] in 
cemeteries of the Roman Catholic Church . . . have been and are regulated 
by and subject to the canons of the Church;” (2) “the canon law of the 
[C]hurch . . . has prohibited and still prohibits removal of bodies from any 
Roman Catholic cemetery for cremation;” (3) “all [Roman Catholic] ceme-
teries are blessed pursuant to prescribed rites of the church and regarded by 
all Roman Catholics in good standing as consecrated ground, and the 
removal of the remains of a Roman Catholic buried [in a Roman Catholic 
cemetery,] . . . for the purpose of cremation, is regarded as a profanation 
and desecration of the remains;” (4) “the cemeteries within any Archdiocese 
have been and are subject to certain rules and regulations prescribed by the 
Archbishop of that Archdiocese, . . . including [rules] which prohibit[] 
removal from such a cemetery of the body of any [C]atholic in good 
standing which has been interred therein;” and, (5) “all rights of interment 
have been and are subject to certain rules and regulations of the cemetery, 
including one which prohibits the removal of a body interred therein, with-
out the written consent of the Archbishop of the . . . [relevant] Archdiocese 
or the Reverend Director of the cemeteries of [that] Archdiocese.”62 
The position taken by the Mitty court finds universal support from 
every other case involving ground sanctified by a religion which strictly 
prohibits disinterment.  Thus, in Friedman v. Agudath Achim North Shore 
Congregation,63 the court held that the surviving children who wished to 
have their parents reintered in a family plot were not entitled to disinter the 
bodies of their parents from ground sanctified by Orthodox Judaism as 
codified in the Shulchan Oruch.64  In declining to issue the injunction 
allowing disinterment despite the laudable reason profferred in support of 
disinterment, the court relied, inter alia, on the fact that disinterment was 
contrary to the tenets of the Orthodox Jewish religion and would offend the 
precepts of the congregation.65  The court so held despite the fact that the 
decedents themselves, though Jewish, were not Orthodox.66 
In Seifer v. Schwimmer,67 the court held that the surviving children who 
wished to reinter the remains of their father next to those of their mother 
were not entitled to disinter the father’s remains from ground sanctified by 
 
62. Id. at 924. 
63. 115 N.E.2d 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 1953). 
64. Friedman, 115 N.E.2d at 557. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. 1 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937). 
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Orthodox Jewry.68  In declining to issue an injunction allowing disinterment 
despite the laudable reasons proffered, the court relied upon the fact that 
disinterment would constitute a desecration of the sanctified burial ground, 
and would otherwise be regarded as a “horror” by Orthodox Jewry.69 
In Klahr v. Nudel,70 the court held that the surviving children who 
wished to reinter the remains of their father in a family plot would not be 
allowed to disinter his remains from ground sanctified by Orthodox 
Jewry.71  As stated earlier, the court was extremely sensitive to the inten-
tions of the children, noting the laudable wish of the family to place the 
body of their sire in a plot of their own,72 and stating that “[i]t is impossible 
to escape the natural desire to sympathize with the sentiments and hopes of 
the bereaved.”73  Nevertheless, the court felt bound to uphold the tenet of 
Orthodox Jewry that prohibited disinterment.  On this point, which com-
mands the bulk of the court’s analysis, the court summed up its view by 
stating that while ecclesiastical law cannot control equity, it was “impos-
sible to set at naught with heedlessness and indifference the traditions and 
rules of any religion, particularly so long established a creed as that of 
Jewry.”74  The court so held even though disinterment may not have been 
against the decedent’s wishes.75 
In In re Weinstein,76 the court reversed a trial court ruling that would 
have allowed a widow to disinter, from a Jewish cemetery, the remains of 
her husband so that they could be reinterred in a cemetery where she could 
ultimately be interred next to him.77  In making its ruling, the court assumed 
not only that the widow’s motives were compelling and laudable, but also 
that she did not expressly consent to her husband’s burial in the cemetery.78  
Despite the compelling nature of both her motives and objections, the court 
seemed to be trying to minimize them, and, in turn, elevate the religious 
considerations.  Specifically, the court justified its reversal primarily on the 
fact that the widow “attended the services proceeding the burial and also at 
 
68. Seifer, 1 N.Y.S.2d at 733. 
69. Id. 
70. 1 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937). 
71. Klahr, 1 N.Y.S.2d at 735. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 734. 
74. Id. at 735. 
75. Id.  In this sense, Friedman and Klahr may represent the ultimate in deference to the 
tenets of a religion, as these courts evaluated this consideration over both the wishes of the 
decedent (as assumed from their religious devotion) and the next-of-kin. 
76. 277 N.Y.S. 425 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935). 
77. Weinstein, 277 N.Y.S. at 425. 
78. Id. 
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the interment,”79 and that it appeared that the decedent was “buried in holy 
Jewish ground and that it is against the custom and violates the law and 
tenets of Hebrew faith to remove the remains of one who has been buried in 
a Jewish cemetery.”80  Additionally, disinterment would “render the burial 
ground unholy and would result in other members of the defendant society 
refusing to be buried in the plot.”81 
Finally, as discussed earlier, in Ingraffia,82 the court held that a widow 
could not disinter and remove remains of her deceased husband from a 
Roman Catholic cemetery to a nonsectarian one.  In refusing to allow the 
disinterment the court stated that because the remains had been interred in 
ground consecrated by the Catholic Church, they could not be removed in 
violation of the canons of the Church.83 
It is significant that all of the reported cases prohibiting disinterment 
support the position of religious institutions whose beliefs prohibit such 
action.  Equally significant is the fact that the cases allowing disinterment 
support these religious institutions as well; for, in every case in which 
disinterment was allowed, permission was granted only after a specific 
finding that disinterment did not violate the beliefs of the religion at issue. 
Thus, in Viscomi v. McGuire,84 the court held that an Episcopalian 
husband, over the objection of his sister-in-law, would be permitted to 
disinter the remains of his deceased wife, who had also been Episcopalian.85  
The court articulated and considered the same equitable factors as have 
been previously established; regarding those relating to religion and 
religiously sanctified ground, the court concluded that the cemetery “had no 
objection throughout and expresses its written consent to the . . . request 
[for disinterment],”86 and that, “[n]o evidence is presented by the sister 
that . . . the Episcopalian faith . . . precludes disinterment or reburial.”87 
In Petition of Davis,88 the court allowed a husband to disinter the 
remains of his wife over the opposition of a particular congregation, but 
only after finding that the opposition “was based on disputed and doubtful 
custom and usage of religious tenets” of the congregation owning the 
 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 425-26. 
81. Id. at 426. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.  
83. Id. 
84. 647 N.Y.S.2d 397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
85. Viscomi, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 401. 
86. Id. at 398. 
87. Id. at 400. 
88. 192 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). 
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portion of the cemetery in which the decedent was buried.89  More specifi-
cally, with respect to the beliefs of the particular congregation at issue, the 
court concluded that “[t]he particular custom and usage here involved is one 
on which even rabbinical authorities disagree,” and that some of the 
relevant rabbinical authorities believed that “disinterment and removal to a 
family plot is permissible.”90 
In Application of Stanton,91 a widow was allowed to disinter the 
remains of her deceased husband, but only after the court conclusively 
established that no good faith religious objection existed.92  Specifically, the 
court noted that the only religious objection was made not by a religious 
authority but by a domestic fraternal organization, and that the potentially 
relevant religious authorities were in conflict, and most tellingly, that the 
application was “opposed ostensibly on the ground that ‘Orthodox Jewish 
law provides that a grave once opened cannot be used for burial purposes 
for a period of seven years,’” but that the real reason, was that 
“someone . . . might seek to recover the moneys paid for the purchase of the 
grave.”93 
In Application of Rosenwasser,94 the court allowed surviving children 
to disinter the remains of their deceased parents, but only after concluding 
that the congregation in control of the cemetery itself filed an affidavit 
stating that the relevant religion tenets were flexible, and that disinterment 
was permitted upon consent of designated ecclesiastical authority.95  Absent 
such an affidavit, it seems unlikely that the court would have allowed 
disinterment; in dicta, the court stated: “[T]his Court is not in accord with 
violation of religious tenets.”96 
In several cases, the courts appeared to have admitted extensive 
testimony from religious organizations before allowing disinterment.  Thus, 
in Application of Baron,97 the court allowed a widow to disinter the remains 
of her deceased husband from a Jewish cemetery, but only after concluding 
that there was significant rabbinical support for allowing the disinterment.98  
The discussion of the relevant rabbinical views was particularly detailed.  
Found most persuasive by the court were the affidavits of Rabbi Harry 
 
89. Petition of Davis, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 174. 
90. Id. at 176. 
91. 216 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961). 
92. Application of Stanton, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 385. 
93. Id. 
94. 120 N.Y.S.2d 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953). 
95. Application of Rosenwasser, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 289. 
96. Id. at 288. 
97. 140 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
98. Application of Baron, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 281. 
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Halpern, President of the Rabbinical Assembly of America and the National 
Organization of Conservative Rabbis in the United States and Canada, who 
averred that: 
It is my opinion that since Jewish Law is always concerned with 
respect for the dead and since the purpose of this disinterment is to 
take the remains of the deceased from a single grave and place it in 
a family plot where other members of the family will be buried, 
this is a gesture of added respect for the deceased and is 
permissible according to Jewish Law.99 
H. S. Linfield, executive secretary of the Jewish Statistical Bureau, stated 
the following from the applicable law as written in the religious code: “It is 
prohibited to remove the dead from one grave to another.  However, it is 
permissible to do so if the removal is to a family plot.”100 
In Herzl Congregation v. Robinson,101 the court allowed the parents to 
disinter the remains of the deceased son over the objection of the religious 
authorities governing the cemetery, but only after concluding that there was 
a serious conflict as to the tenets governing disinterment.102  Specifically, 
the court stated: “[i]n the instant case, there is a serious conflict in the 
testimony as to whether or not the rules and regulations of the Orthodox 
Jewish Church would permit the disinterment of a body, particularly in 
view of the fact that the purpose thereof was to bury it in another Jewish 
cemetery.”103 
In Raisler v. Krakauer Simon Schreiber Congregation,104 the court 
allowed the surviving children to disinter the remains of their deceased 
parents over the objections of the Jewish congregation that had sold them 
burial rights.105  The court allowed the disinterment only after determining 
that the one of the most important rabbis of the Western World had 
concluded that disinterment under the circumstances did not violate Jewish 
law.106  On the issue of disinterment under Jewish law, the rabbi 
 
99. Id. at 280. 
100. Id. (quoting Yoreh Deah in 2 CARO CODE, ch. 363, ¶ 1). 
101. 253 P. 654 (Wash. 1927). 
102. Herzl Congregation, 253 P. at 655. 
103. Id. 
104. 47 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1944). 
105. Raisler, 47 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (observing that the actual cemetery did not object to their 
disinterment). 
106. Id.  Specifically, the court relied on an arbitration decision by Rabbi Moses Hyamson, 
and noted his qualifications as follows: B.A., L.L.B., L.L.D. (University of London), who had 
been the dean of 
the Ecclesiastical and Arbitration Board of the United Synagogue of London, England, 
then the Supreme Jewish Court of the British Empire, . . . the Chief Rabbinate of the 
British Empire; the author of books, pamphlets and essays including “The Oral Law” 
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“recognized the right of children to remove to a family burial plot the 
remains of their parents, regardless of the fact that such family plot con-
tained no burials theretofore,” and that “there is no force to the point made, 
that a cemetery plot is worthless after one is disinterred, except that the 
grave may not be used by a child of the deceased, where the disinterment 
has been made in proper cases.”107 
Finally, in Currier v. Woodlawn Cemetery,108 the court allowed a son 
to disinter the remains of his deceased mother, but only after concluding 
that there was no religious opposition.109  Specifically, the court stated, 
inter alia, “[i]f the deceased had been a member of a faith which forbade 
disinterment . . . then only compelling considerations would justify disinter-
ment and removal.  But the case before us presents no such factors.”110 
As the foregoing litany of cases illustrates, disinterment from conse-
crated ground has never been permitted when it violates the beliefs of the 
religious denomination at issue.  Rather, disinterment has only been al-
lowed when religious beliefs are not relevant or permit the practice. 
Application of Sherman111 is the only relevant case that arguably runs 
counter to the published opinion discussed herein.  In that case, a widow 
was allowed to disinter the remains of her deceased husband and remove 
them to a family plot.112  Disinterment was allowed under circumstances in 
which the husband had been a member of a synagogue, and the synagogue 
and its Rabbi opposed the application.113  There was no discussion, how-
ever, as to which denomination of Judaism was involved, whether that 
denomination forbade disinterment, or whether the decedent was devoted to 
it.  Rather, disinterment was opposed “on the grounds that there are deed 
restriction against disinterments and that the application is not made in good 
faith.”114  Most critically, the court allowed the disinterment because it felt 
that the bonds of matrimony were stronger than the religious bonds, stating 
 
and “Collatio of Roman and Mosaic Law;” . . . a Professor of Codes of the Jewish 
Theological Seminary[; the] life Rabbi of the Congregation Orach Chaim; a 
contributor to Jewish Journals in England and the United States; . . . president of the 
New York Board of Jewish Ministers[;] . . . [and] a Rabbinical Vice-President of the 
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America and Vice-President of the 
Jewish Conciliation Board of New York, which he had helped to found. 
Id. at 939-40. 
107. Id. at 940. 
108. 90 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1949). 
109. Currier, 90 N.E.2d at 19. 
110. Id. (citations omitted). 
111. 107 N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951). 
112. Application of Sherman, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 906. 
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that “[t]he bonds of marriage are strong and to be upheld; separation after 
death of those who have been joined in matrimony cannot be lightly per-
mitted.”115  As such, Sherman appears to be the only published opinion that 
even arguably elevates the wishes of the next of kin over the interests of the 
relevant religion. 
C. REDUCING A STATUTORY IMPERATIVE TO AN EQUITABLE 
CONSIDERATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST: THE CURIOUS TREATMENT 
OF SEEMINGLY UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTES 
Deference to religion in the disinterment context, as manifest in legal 
protection from desecration afforded religiously consecrated ground, is not 
limited to the equitable factors discussed herein.  More recently, some state 
legislatures have bolstered this protection by specifically according statu-
tory rights to those who control religious cemeteries.116  Typically, these 
statutes provide that once a decedent is interred in a religiously consecrated 
cemetery the remains cannot be disinterred except in accordance with the 
rules, regulations, or canons of the controlling religious denomination; that 
the relevant representation of the religious are the sole judges of these 
restrictions; and that the rights of the controlling religious entity operate 
against the next-of-kin.117 
Based on the language of these statutes, it would seem that the next-of-
kin could not disinter from cemeteries controlled by religious denomi-
nations that adhere to rules, regulations, or canons that prohibit disinter-
ment.118  Yet, despite what appears to be a clearly stated statutory right of a 
religious entity to prohibit disinterment from its cemetery, the courts have 
not in any way deferred to the statutes.  Rather, the courts have considered 
the statutes nothing more than somewhat relevant to the application of the 
equitable factors governing disinterment—typically the “interest of the 
public” factor.119 
One prime example of so treating a statute is provided by California.  
Specifically, Section 7980 of the California Health and Safety Code 
decrees: 
The heirs, relatives or friends of any decedent whose remains have 
been interred in any cemetery owned, governed or controlled by 
 
115. Id. 
116. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7980 (West 2007); 10 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 81 (West 2006).  
117. Id.  
118. Id.  
119. See, e.g., Ingraffia v. Doughtery, 29 North. Co. R. 294, 300 (Pa. 1944). 
       
2007] RELIGION AND DISINTERMENT 377 
any religious corporation . . . shall not disinter, remove, reinter or 
dispose of any such remains except in accordance with the rules, 
regulations and discipline of such religious denomination, society 
or church.  The officers, representatives or agents of the church or 
religious society shall be the sole judge of the requirements of the 
rules, regulations and discipline of such religious denomination, 
society or church.120 
It is difficult to imagine greater protection afforded consecrated ground 
than the one mandated by Section 7980.  This impression is confirmed not 
only by the plain meaning of the language noted above, but also by the 
analysis of the legislative history of Section 7980.  The provision was 
derived from Section 17 of Chapter 312 of the statutes of 1923, which 
governed removal of remains upon the abandonment of a cemetery.121  
Then, in 1931, the 1923 statute was made a part of the General Cemetery 
Act, by operation of Chapter 1148, page 2434, Section 28 at pages 2448-49 
of the 1931 codification.122 
This history was subsequently analyzed by the Mitty court.123  Based 
upon this history, the court concluded that Section 7980 “literally applied to 
everything in the General Cemetery Act,” including private action for 
disinterment brought by relatives of the decedent.124  The court also noted 
that the original draft of Section 7980 was prefaced with the phrase 
“Nothing in this act . . . shall authorize or permit,” that this preface created 
ambiguity as to whether disinterment was prohibited if opposed by the 
religious denomination, and that the preface was omitted in the final 
drafts.125 
Nonetheless, despite recognizing what it itself termed an unambiguous 
statute, the court concluded that when a burial has been made in a religious 
cemetery as described in Section 7980, that section did nothing more than 
“give[] preference to the rules, regulations and discipline of the church over 
 
120. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7980 (West 2007). 
121. Mitty v. Oliveira, 244 P.2d 921, 928 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). 
122. Mitty, 244 P.2d at 928. 
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the desires of the relatives of the decedent.”126  The court also concluded 
that the statute was nothing more than an expression of a policy.127 
A second, though subtler, example of this phenomenon is found in 
Pennsylvania law.  Specifically, similar to Section 7980 of the California 
Health and Safety Code, Pennsylvania statutory laws provides: 
Whensoever any property . . . has heretofore been or shall 
hereafter be bequeathed, devised, or conveyed to any ecclesiastical 
corporation, bishop, ecclesiastic, or other person, for the use of any 
church . . . for or in trust for . . . sepulture, . . . the same shall be 
taken and held subject to the control and disposition of such 
officers or authorities of such church . . . having a controlling 
power according to the rules, regulations, usages, or corporate 
requirements of such church, . . . which control and subject to the 
rules and regulations, usages, canons, discipline and requirements 
of the religious body, denomination or organization to which such 
church . . . shall belong.”128 
Datz v. Dougherty129 was the first case in which this statute was 
applied.  The Datz court held that a surviving spouse who wished to reinter 
her husband’s remains so that the entire family could be buried together 
could not disinter her husband from ground sanctified by the Roman 
Catholic Church in violation of the tenets of the Church.130  In support of 
the holding, the court focused in part on the equitable factors, and in part on 
the statute, stating: “The facts themselves necessarily bring into considera-
tion, and most careful consideration, the control of the ecclesiastical laws of 
deceased’s church over his last resting place. . . .”131  Ultimately, the court 
concluded that disinterment could not be allowed because “[u]nder the 
cases cited pursuant to that act[,] there can be no dispute that church law is 
paramount in the control of cemeteries,” and that the requirement that 
“burials are made in ecclesiastical cemeteries subject to the rules, 
 
126. Id.  Specifically, the appellate court considered, inter alia, that burial had been 
“effected . . . in full conformity with the rules, regulations and discipline of the church,” and 
concluded that: “this is a case for observance of the policy expressed in section 7980 of the Code, 
which does not sanction removal except in conformity with the rules, regulations and discipline of 
the church.  Id. at 929. 
127. Id. 
128. 10 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 81 (West 2006). 
129. 41 Pa. D. & C. 505 (1941). 
130. Datz, 41 Pa. D. & C. at 513. 
131. Id. at 506. 
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regulations, canons, and discipline of the church, must be held to apply to 
removals as well.”132 
As such, the Datz court appeared to be relying on the statute in a 
significant way.  However, the importance of the statute appears to have 
been undermined in Ingraffia.133  As discussed previously, Ingraffia denied 
an application for disinterment from ground consecrated by the Roman 
Catholic Church.  Regarding the Pennsylvania statute, the court recognized 
that: 
The rules and regulations, usages, canons, discipline, and require-
ments of religious denominations or organizations relative to the 
right of Sepulcher have been written into the law of the State by 
the Act of June 20, 1936, P. L. 353, section I (10 P.S. 81), and by 
the decisions of our courts . . . the pertinent canons of the Catholic 
Church and the pertinent rules and regulations of cemeteries of the 
Catholic Church, are written into the law of the State by the 
aforesaid Act of Assembly.134 
Despite this recognition, the court held that the statute was only one factor 
to consider in making a disinterment decision, i.e., the factor relating to the 
interest of the public.  Specifically, the court stated: 
Reference has already been made to the fact that such restrictions 
are part of the law of the State and must be considered by a court 
of equity in passing upon the propriety of a reinterment. 
. . . . 
The effectuation of plaintiffs’ wishes would not only violate the 
aforementioned policy of the law, but would also violate the 
fundamental concept of the sanctity of religious beliefs.  To this 
extent plaintiffs’ wishes run counter to the interests of the 
public.135 
 
132. Id. at 513-14; see also Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Pa. 293, 303 (1862) (finding a widow 
could not disinter remains of her deceased husband from a church cemetery when disinternment 
was opposed by the church because, inter alia, the body lay in “consecrated ground” and “was 
buried with the ceremonies of the church”). 
133. Ingraffia v. Doughtery, 29 North. Co. R. 294, Pincite (Pa. 1944). 
134. Id. at 298. 
135. Id. at 298, 300. 
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IV. THE RELEVANCE, OR LACK THEREOF, OF THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE FREE EXERCISE 
CLAUSE 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, American courts recognized 
that disinterment decisions in the United States were the province of civil 
courts applying equitable principles, and not ecclesiastical courts (or civil 
courts, for that mater) applying ecclesiastical law.136  Though the courts 
rarely, if ever, specifically invoked the Establishment Clause137 as justifica-
tion, their early holdings are certainly consistent with it, and with general 
principles of separation of church and state. 
The earliest significant American case grounding the disinterment 
decision in secular, as opposed to ecclesiastical law was In re Beekman 
Street.138  In that case, the City of New York condemned an eighteenth 
century cemetery, and made a lump sum payment to the religious corpora-
tion that had been maintaining the grounds.139  Litigation arose when the 
claimant—the daughter of one of the decedents interred in the cemetery—
sought a portion of the payment to cover the costs of removing and rein-
terring her father’s remains.  A decision to indemnify the daughter was ulti-
mately based upon the report of Referee Samuel B. Ruggles.  The thesis of 
the report was that historically, in England, protecting remains was within 
the jurisdiction of the common law, but the ecclesiastical courts gradually 
usurped that jurisdiction; as there were no ecclesiastical courts in America, 
the ancient and rightful authority of the secular courts had to be restored.140 
Forty years later, In re Donn reached the same conclusion in an 
equitable context.  As stated earlier, In re Donn involved surviving children 
who sought an order allowing them to disinter the remains of their mother 
from a Roman Catholic cemetery, which opposed disinterment as against 
the canons of the church.141  The court ultimately denied equitable relief, 
i.e., denied a motion to order disinterment, but only after stressing that the 
Roman Catholic Church had no jurisdiction over the matter.142  Specifi-
cally, the court reviewed the historical English doctrine on this subject, and 
agreed with the Ruggles report in all relevant respects.143  The court then 
concluded that, in the United States: 
 
136. See infra text accompanying notes 138-145; Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, § 4. 
137. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
138. Removal and Reinterment, supra note 1, § 4(b). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. 189, 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891). 
142. Id. at 190. 
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While we grant to all religious organizations the largest and 
broadest latitude and liberty to adopt all or any proper rules or 
regulations, to the end that their votaries may worship God 
according to the dictates of their conscience, we have jealously 
watched and resisted any and all attempts on their part to usurp 
powers or authority outside or beyond their legitimate functions of 
caring for and administering spiritual affairs.144 
After being first articulated in the nineteenth century, the notion that 
secular courts applying equitable principles were the sole arbiters of 
disinterment disputes became entrenched doctrine by the middle of the 
twentieth century.  As stated by the court in Friedman v. Gomel Chesed 
Hebrew Cemetery Association of Elizabeth: “This court is not bound by the 
ecclesiastical law.  That is too well established to need citation of 
authorities.”145 
While entrenching this perhaps evident doctrine, however, the courts 
were simultaneously according religious law great deference while making 
their equitable determinations.  Most extreme in this regard is Ingraffia.146  
As noted earlier, the court in Ingraffia denied an equitable motion for 
disinterment based in large part on the fact that the canon law of the Roman 
Catholic Church forbade disinterment.  In so holding, the court came very 
close to literally equating state law with canon law, stating: 
The rules and regulations, usages, canons, discipline and require-
ments of religious denominations or organizations relative to the 
right of sepulcher have been written into the law of the State by 
the Act of June 20, 1935, P.L. 353, section 1 (10 P.S. 81); and by 
the decisions of our courts.  The law recognizes and upholds 
reasonable cemetery regulations where, as here, the cemetery has 
reserved the right to regulate.  Clearly, then, the pertinent canons 
of the Catholic Church and the pertinent rules and regulations of 
cemeteries of the Catholic Church, which prohibit disinterment 
from a Catholic Cemetery to a non-Catholic cemetery, are written 
into the law of the State by the aforesaid Act of Assembly and the 
decisions thereunder. 
. . . . 
 
144. Id. 
145. Friedman v. Gomel Chesed Hebrew Cemetery Ass’n of Elizabeth, 92 A.2d 117, 118 
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The effectuation of plaintiffs’ wishes would contravene the 
ecclesiastical and cemetery restrictions of the Catholic Church.  
Reference has already been made to the fact that such restrictions 
are part of the law of the State and must be considered by a court 
of equity in passing upon the propriety of a reinterment.147 
To a lesser degree, virtually every case discussed herein affords 
religion the same deference.  Even Friedman, which, as quoted earlier, 
considered that it was not necessary to even cite cases in support of the 
proposition that ecclesiastical law could not control secular courts, stated in 
the clause immediately subsequent that “it is equally well established that, 
while not bound by the ecclesiastical law in any given case, the court, in 
arriving at its decision, should consider the ecclesiastical law and give to it 
such weight as will bring out an equitable result.”148 
Given this verbiage, eventually, perhaps inevitably, one court finally 
concluded that the deference accorded religion reached an unconstitutional 
level, and found the entire equitable analysis to be in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  Thus, in Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n,149 the 
plaintiff sought to have her father and sister disinterred from an Orthodox 
Jewish cemetery and reinterred in a family plot; the cemetery opposed the 
request on religious grounds.150  The trial court heard testimony from both 
Orthodox and Reform rabbis, and from others regarding the role religion 
played in the lives of the decedents.151  The court then relied on this 
testimony in applying the four equitable factors, denying disinterment in a 
way that has come to be expected in religion cases.152  Specifically, 
regarding the intentions of the decedents, the court inferred from the 
testimony of the Orthodox rabbis that the decedent father was an Orthodox 
Jew, and would therefore not want to be disinterred in violation of Jewish 
laws.153  Regarding the interests of the cemetery, the court concluded that 
disinterment in violation of Jewish law would have a negative impact on it.  
Regarding the public interest, the court concluded that desecration of 
hollowed ground would have a negative impact on “others.”154 
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The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the analysis of 
the lower court, which, again, comported with the traditional equitable 
analysis as applied in cases involving religious decedents, was unconstitu-
tional in that it was based on the resolution of conflicting theological prin-
ciples, and was therefore inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.155  
The court reasoned that these Amendments, as applied by the Supreme 
Court in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Null Memorial 
Presbyterian Church,156 dictated the disinterment dispute be decided 
pursuant to “neutral principles of law.”157  In remanding, the court held that 
“neutral principles of law” dictated that the traditional equitable analysis be 
modified so as to consider only: (1) “[t]he intent of the decedent and wishes 
of the surviving spouse or next of kin;” (2) “[w]hether a written contract 
between the cemetery and decedent or next of kin exists that discusses 
rights of removal;” (3) “[l]ength of time interred;” (4) “[t]he practicality of 
disinterment;” and, (5) “[i]mpact of disinterments on others.”158 
If Wolf is correct, virtually every court that rendered a decision 
involving a religious decedent would have done so pursuant to an analytical 
framework that also violated the Establishment Clause.  For over a century 
the courts have heard testimony, sometimes conflicting, on the dictates of 
religious law,159 and concluded that, as adherents to a religion, decedents 
would wish their remains were dealt with according to the relevant religious 
dictates.160  Consistency of past application, of course, is no reason to per-
petuate an unconstitutional analysis.  The Wolf formulation of the equitable 
factors, however, presents difficulties of its own.  From an evidentiary 
perspective, it seems impossible to determine the intent of the religious 
decedent without referring to the religious precepts by which he or she 
lived.  Indeed, if the interment decision were guided by those precepts, 
refusing to consider them in the context of disinterment would result in a 
baseless finding regarding the intent of the decedent.  It would be equally 
impossible, or baseless, to determine the impact of disinterment on others if 
the “others” are congregants of the decedent for whom the impact of the 
disinterment of the decedent is also shaped by the same religious precepts. 
From a constitutional perspective, the equitable courts do not appear to 
be trying to resolve disputed issues of religious doctrine, in violation of the 
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Establishment Clause.  Rather, while they are recognizing that different 
denominations of a religion have different views regarding disinterment, 
they are simply trying to determine to which denomination the decedent 
belonged.  In this sense, the equitable courts may be walking a fine line 
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.161 
On the latter point, a few courts, falling on the other side of the line as 
compared to Wolf, have suggested that the Free Exercise Clause actually 
requires the equitable courts to consider the religious views of the decedent. 
In the context of religious opposition to an autopsy the court in Atkins v. 
Medical Examiner of Westchester County,162 suggested this by stating: 
Freedom of religion which necessarily includes the right to follow 
the tenet of one’s faith is one of the most basic and fundamental 
concepts of a democratic form of government.  So vital is this right 
that it has been embodied in and remains guaranteed by both our 
state and federal constitutions. 
. . . . 
The individual’s right of free choice in such an important area as 
religion must prevail over the State’s curiosity as to the cause of 
death.  The bereaved have a right to proclaim that a body once laid 
to rest should no longer be disturbed—that the dead be allowed to 
rest in peace and that the body be returned to its Maker in the form 
and manner best calculated to insure His favor.163 
Another, in the context of disinterment, was Ingraffia, which stated: 
the decedent requires us to keep inviolate that faith even in his last 
repose.  To deny to the dead the faith which sustained them in life 
is to deny to the living the faith that sustains them in death.  In this 
sense the fundamental American ideal of religious freedom 
transcends the confines of the grave.164 
Tamarkin v. Children of Israel Inc.165 is the decision that has gone the 
furthest in making the Free Exercise Clause relevant to the disinterment of a 
religious decedent.  In Tamarkin, an Orthodox Jewish congregation alleged 
that applying a state statute granting the next of kin the right to disinter was 
“contrary to the religious beliefs of the Orthodox Jewish religion and [was], 
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therefore, an unconstitutional interference with their religious beliefs.”166  
The court determined that the constitutional issue would only be before it if 
the congregation could prove that the religious beliefs and wishes of the 
decedents forbade disinterment and were therefore contrary to the wishes of 
the next of kin to disinter.167  In determining that the decedents did not hold 
such contrary religious views, the Tamarkin court considered the very 
evidence that the Wolf court deemed in violation of the Establishment 
Clause, to wit, conflicting views regarding a particular tenet of the Jewish 
religion, Rabbinical testimony, and the personal religious beliefs of the 
deceased.168 
Ultimately, when the doctrine of and notions stemming from the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are balanced, the 
analysis returns to the traditional equitable one.  As summarized by the 
court in Tamarkin: 
The . . . cases hold that ecclesiastical law is not binding on a court, 
but it may be competent evidence to show customs and wishes of 
those who observe its mandates.  These cases seem to turn on the 
fact that the deceaseds were devout members of their respective 
religions, and the presumption would be that their wishes were that 
their remains should be treated in accordance with the rules of 
their religion.169 
V. CONCLUSION 
For over a century, the courts in the United States have been 
proclaiming that disinterment decisions are the province of civil, as opposed 
to ecclesiastical, courts.  While this may be true from a constitutional and 
general jurisprudential perspective, the fact remains that religion, when 
relevant, completely controls the decision to disinter.  While this phenom-
enon may raise Establishment Clause issues, religion appears destined to 
maintain its controlling role nonetheless. 
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